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I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous article, we identified "anti-evasion doctrines" (AEDs)
that the U.S. Supreme Court develops in various areas of constitu-
tional law to prevent the circumvention of constitutional principles
the Court has sought to enforce.' In many cases, we observed that
AEDs were developed to backstop decision rules 2 that were designed
as rules, and that the AEDs performed this function by taking the
form of standards. 3 Canvassing the benefits and tradeoffs of optimiz-
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
** Associate Professor, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University.
The authors thank Lou Virelli and participants at a University of Tennessee College of
Law Faculty Forum for helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions, especially Dwight
Aarons, Ben Barton, Amy Hess, Gary Pulsinelli, John Sobieski, Greg Stein, and David
Wolitz. John Harrison deserves special thanks for encouraging us to explore this topic.
Irena Chernova and Rich Fillmore provided valuable research assistance.
1. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitu-
tional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773.
2. "Decision rules" are those doctrines the Court develops to "implement" constitu-
tional principles, or what Mitch Berman calls "constitutional operative propositions." See
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004). For "im-
plementation" of the Constitution through decision rules, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
3. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1779-96.
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ing constitutional principles by using AEDs, we concluded that they
were likely worth the costs in additional complexity and possible in-
crease in decision costs to judges. 4
But the Court's use of AEDs is not foreordained. In this Article, we
take up the phenomenon of anti-anti-evasion, in which the Court de-
clines to design AEDs to prevent alleged evasions of constitutional
principle. As was true of AEDs, examples can be found across consti-
tutional law. In this Article, we identify a number of occasions in
which the Court engages in anti-anti-evasion, then seek to under-
stand the reasons why it does so. In the end, we hope to shed light on
the practice of anti-anti-evasion, as well as to illuminate our earlier
study with a working hypothesis of when the Court will and when it
will not backstop its decisions with subsequent AEDs.
Part II provides a brief overview of our theory of AEDs. Part III
furnishes several examples of anti-anti-evasion from constitutional
law. Part IV discusses the types of reasons given by the Court when it
declines the invitation to create AEDs, which we argue are not suffi-
cient to explain fully the decision to engage in anti-anti-evasion. Ac-
cordingly, Part V includes our working hypothesis that the Court will
not create AEDs where it believes that the constitutional principle is
adequately protected by robust political safeguards-primarily in
cases involving taxing or spending decisions, including the provision
of government-subsidized goods and services. Our hypothesis is par-
tially confirmed, moreover, by the Court's resolution of the constitu-
tional issues surrounding the Affordable Care Act in the much-awaited
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius5 (NFIB) case,
which we also discuss in Part V. A brief conclusion follows.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF AEDS
Our prior work identified a pattern in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence that we termed "anti-evasion doctrines." In numerous
and varied areas of constitutional doctrine, the Court initially im-
plements a constitutional principle via a decision rule that typically
resembles an ex ante rule.6 That decision rule, in turn, is bolstered or
backstopped by a subsequent AED-that is, by a later decision rule
that is designed to prevent circumvention of the constitutional prin-
ciple through formal compliance with the earlier decision rule.' Just
4. Id. at 1796-1815.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1793.
7. Id.
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as the initial decision rule tends to take the form of a rule, the AED
tends to be formulated as an ex post standard.8
AEDs tend to be one of four types of constitutional "tests." First,
they occur as "pretext tests," asking whether government is, under
the guise of a constitutionally permissible objective, actually attempt-
ing to regulate in a manner that the Constitution proscribes.9 Second,
they take the form of "proxy tests," which ferret out regulations that
depend on a purportedly neutral characteristic, but in reality use
that characteristic as a proxy for some other, prohibited characteris-
tic.10 Third, AEDs are packaged as "purpose tests" that ask whether
the law has been "developed or applied for constitutionally illegiti-
mate reasons."" Finally, AEDs occur as "effects tests" that focus on
the effects of a regulation rather than its explicit content. 12
Although each of these tests has a slightly different emphasis, as
AEDs, they share a common doctrinal purpose-i.e., to prevent indi-
rect violations of a constitutional principle through formal compli-
ance with the Court's decision rules.'" Put differently, AEDs attempt
to optimize constitutional enforcement by ensuring that governmen-
tal officials cannot easily evade or undermine constitutional com-
mands by manipulating gaps left open in the decision rules developed
to implement those commands.14 Despite their utility and ubiquity,
however, the Court does not employ AEDs in every circumstance. No-
table areas of constitutional doctrine exist where the Court has de-
clined to create or develop an AED, raising the question with which
this Article primarily is concerned: What does it mean when the
Court engages in such anti-anti-evasion?
III. EXAMPLES OF ANTI-ANTI-EVASION
When we use the term anti-anti-evasion, we mean to describe a
situation characterized by the following pattern. At Time T, the Court
enforces a constitutional principle by articulating certain decision
8. Id. at 1780-93 (offering examples). As we noted in our previous article, we think
this is the typical pattern revealed in the Court's decisions. But this is not to say that the
pattern holds in every instance where an AED is employed. Some AEDs may take more
rule-like form to backstop standard-like decision rules, and there are circumstances where
the AEDs are pronounced simultaneously with the primary decision rule. Id. at 1793 n.159.
9. Id. at 1780-84. With the exception of the "proxy test" discussed below, we borrow
the terminology for these anti-evasion doctrines from Richard Fallon. See FALLON, supra
note 2, at 77-79 (describing the following doctrinal tests: (1) "forbidden-content tests"; (2)
"suspect-content test"; (3) "balancing tests"; (4) "non-suspect-content tests"; (5) "effects
tests"; (6) "purpose tests"; and (7) "appropriate deliberation tests').
10. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1784-88.
11. Id. at 1780 (quoting FALLON, supra note 2, at 79); id. at 1788-93.
12. Id. at 1780, 1788-93.
13. Id. at 1793.
14. Id. at 1796.
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rules that other judicial actors will follow in subsequent cases. Then,
at Time T1, the Court is presented with a case in which the form of
the prior rules is observed, but the regulation at issue nonetheless is
alleged to subvert the substance of the constitutional principle those
prior rules were supposed to implement. This alleged subversion pre-
sents the Court with an opportunity to create an AED, but the Court
refuses to do so, judging the challenged regulation to satisfy the Con-
stitution's requirements. As we demonstrate in this Part, the Court
engages in anti-anti-evasion with some regularity both in cases in-
volving structural limitations on the power of federal and state gov-
ernments, as well as those involving claims of individual rights.15
A. Anti-Anti-Evasion in Structure and Powers Cases
1. The Spending Power
South Dakota v. Dole suggested that the Court would invalidate
conditional spending requirements that were so onerous as to be con-
sidered "coercive."16 Until NFIB v. Sebelius,17 however, neither the
Court nor the lower courts had applied that suggestion so as to create
a full-fledged AED.'1 Indeed, in a recent case' 9 involving a federal
statute "proscribing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of enti-
ties that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds,"2 0 the Court de-
clined to flesh out the "coercion" exception and found the law to be a
valid exercise of Congress's power to impose conditions on the receipt
of federal funds. In response to the defendant's argument that the
penalties were "unduly coercive, and impermissibly sweeping, condi-
tion[s] on the grant of federal funds,"2 ' the Court responded that the
bribery statute was "authority to bring federal power to bear directly
15. As was true of the examples of anti-evasion doctrines in our earlier article, Den-
ning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1779-93, we make no claim that our examples here exhaust
the universe of anti-anti-evasion decisions by the Court. Additionally, we do not mean to
say that every instance of anti-anti-evasion follows the above-described pattern in precise
detail.
16. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) ("Our decisions have recog-
nized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" (citation omitted));
Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1783-84 (noting that Dole suggested a type of AED).
17. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
18. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288-90
(4th Cir. 2002) (discussing judicial treatment of coercion theory); see also Lynn A. Baker &
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 467-
68 (2003) (noting that Dole's coercion test has not fulfilled its promise and that 'lower
courts have consistently failed to find impermissible coercion").
19. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
20. Id. at 602 (summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)).
21. Id. at 608.
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on individuals who convert public spending into unearned private
gain, not a means for bringing federal economic might to bear on a
State's own choices of public policy."22 In NFIB, however, seven mem-
bers of the Court fleshed out the "coercion" language of Dole, holding
that because the Affordable Care Act radically expanded Medicaid's
coverage-to the point of fundamentally remaking the program-
Congress could not penalize states' refusal to participate in the new
program by withholding all Medicaid funds, including those for the
existing program. 3 We explore the significance of the Court's imple-
mentation of an AED after years of anti-anti-evasion in spending
cases below.24
2. The Copyright Clause
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,25 challengers argued that the Copyright
Term Extension Act, which lengthened by twenty years the term of
existing and future copyrights in the United States, violated Con-
gress's Article I, Section 8 power to create copyrights for 'limited
Times."2 6 For existing works, the plaintiffs argued, "[t]he 'limited
Tim [e]' in effect when a copyright is secured .. . becomes the constitu-
tional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to ex-
tend."27 Alternatively, they argued that extensions of existing copy-
rights should be subject to a heightened standard of review to ensure
that they conformed to the purposes of the Clause.28
Relying on "[t]ext, history, and precedent," 29 the Court rejected
these arguments. First, the Court concluded that nothing about the
word "limited" prevented the copyright extension from being applied
to existing copyrights.30 Second, "[h]istory reveals an unbroken con-
gressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copy-
rights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright pro-
tection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime."3 1 The
Court concluded that "the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not
at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
22. Id.
23. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-06 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
24. See infra Part V.
25. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
27. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
28. Id. at 218.
29. Id. at 199.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 200.
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judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be." 2
Significantly, for our purposes, the Court rejected the petitioners'
argument that "permitting Congress to extend existing copyrights
allows it to evade the 'limited Times' constraint by creating effectively
perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions."33 According to the
Court, the petitioners failed to produce evidence that the retroactive
extension was motivated by a desire to create, or had the effect of cre-
ating, a perpetual copyright. 3 4
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Subsidies
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) describes the
judge-made rules inferred from the Constitution's grant of authority
over interstate commerce to Congress. The DCCD prohibits state and
local governments from, with a few exceptions, discriminating against
or otherwise unduly burdening interstate and foreign commerce."
States may not, for example, grant a tax credit to incentivize in-state
production of a commodity, but disallow the credit when production
occurs outside the state.3 6 However, the Court has never held that a
discriminatory cash subsidy-which has an identical economic ef-
fect-violates the DCCD.3 1 When a discriminatory tax credit in Maine
was challenged," the town seeking to preserve the exemption argued
32. Id. at 208.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 199-200 ("[T]here is no cause to suspect that a purpose to evade the 'limited
Times' prescription prompted Congress to adopt the CTEA."); id. at 209-10 ("Critically, we
again emphasize, petitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally signifi-
cant threshold with respect to 'limited Times' that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not.").
But see id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The economic effect of this 20-year extension-
the longest blanket extension since the Nation's founding-is to make the copyright term
not limited, but virtually perpetual."). Justice Breyer went on to suggest that while Con-
gress might not have intended to act unconstitutionally, it might have intended to test the
limits of its power, a tendency that AEDs can deter. Compare id. at 256, with Denning &
Kent, supra note 1, at 1802 (suggesting that AEDs can raise costs to official actors seeking
to regulate to the very limit of their power by blurring the lines separating permissible
from impermissible actions).
35. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008).
36. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
37. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) ("We
have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so
now. We have, however, noted that '[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul' of the negative Commerce Clause." (citations omitted)); see also infra
notes 76-91 and accompanying text (discussing Court's refusal to treat tax expenditures as
the equivalent of direct public support for religion). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998) (discussing analy-
sis of subsidies under the DCCD).
38. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). Maine
exempted from property taxes charities that primarily benefitted Maine citizens. Id. at 567.
402 [Vol. 41:397
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that it was economically indistinguishable from a cash subsidy and
should be treated the same way.39 The Court declined this invitation
for similar treatment, in part on the strength of precedent that start-
ed from "the premise that there is a constitutionally significant dif-
ference between subsidies and tax exemptions." 40
4. Use Taxes
Before the Court's decision in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady4'
rationalized the Court's DCCD tax jurisprudence, a welter of quite
formal rules determined the constitutionality of state and local tax-
es. 42 One of the rules was that states may not tax interstate com-
merce qua interstate commerce.43 When Washington sought to offset
the loss of revenue from goods purchased out-of-state, yet used in
Washington, by imposing a corresponding "use" tax on the privilege of
using goods bought elsewhere, challengers argued that the tax was
really a tax on interstate commerce itself, motivated by a desire to
create a protective tariff on goods imported into the state." For the
Court, Justice Cardozo rejected those arguments. First, he accepted
Washington's argument that it was not imposing a tax on the sale of
the item, but merely its use within the state. Citing a number of cas-
es, he wrote that "[t]hings acquired or transported in interstate com-
merce may be subjected to a property tax, non-discriminatory in its
operation, when they have become part of the common mass of prop-
erty within the state of destination."4 5 Moreover, noting the credit
Washington gave for any sales tax paid on the purchase, Cardozo ob-
served that the same amount of tax was levied on interstate sales as
on intrastate sales. 4 6
To the argument that "a tax upon the use, even though not unlaw-
ful by force of its effects alone, is vitiated by the motives that led to
its adoption," which "cause it to be stigmatized as equivalent to a
protective tariff,"47 Cardozo had two responses. First, he noted that
impermissible motive alone is usually insufficient to invalidate an
39. Id. at 589.
40. Id. at 590.
41. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
42. For an overview, see 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A.
SWAIN, STATE TAXATION IT 4.01-4.13 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2012).
43. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946).
44. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-83, 586 (1937).
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id. at 584. Again, the Court noted that similar taxes had been upheld in a variety
of other circumstances. Id. at 585 (citing cases regarding taxes that equally affect inter-
state and intrastate sales).
47. Id. at 586.
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otherwise valid measure. 4 8 Second, he argued that the use tax was
truly laid on property imported then placed into use, as opposed to
property merely imported. This was a distinction with a difference,
he maintained:
Catch words and labels, such as the words "protective tariff," are
subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and
must be watched with circumspection lest they put us off our
guard. A tariff, whether protective or for revenue, burdens the very
act of importation, and if laid by a state upon its commerce with
another is equally unlawful whether protection or revenue is the
motive back of it. But a tax upon use, or, what is equivalent for
present purposes, a tax upon property after importation is over, is
not a clog upon the process of importation at all, any more than a
tax upon the income or profits of a business. 49
Current doctrine permits "compensatory taxes" placed on out-of-
state, but not in-state, goods, in order to compensate for taxes paid by
the latter, but not by the former. 0 The use tax is the paradigmatic
compensatory tax; few other taxes claimed to be compensatory have
survived judicial review.5 1
5. The Import-Export Clause
Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution prohibits states
from laying "imposts or duties" on "imports or exports" without con-
gressional consent, save for those "absolutely necessary" for carrying
out inspection laws. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
held52-probably incorrectly 5 3-that the Clause applied only to for-
eign imports and exports.5 4 Before Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages'5 was
decided in 1976, the rule was that taxes could not be imposed on im-
ported goods until they ceased to be "imports," which was held to be
the point at which goods were taken out of their "original package"
and commingled with other property at rest in the taxing jurisdic-
tion.5 6 The Michelin Tire case overturned more than a century of case
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See generally HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 42, 1 4.14[3] [c] [i].
51. Id. 4.14[3][c][ii] ("The Court's most recent encounters with the 'complementary'
or 'compensatory' tax doctrine continue its modern trend of evaluating states' 'complemen-
tary tax' arguments with considerable skepticism.").
52. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 136 (1868).
53. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621-37
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export
Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999).
54. Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 136.
55. 423 U.S. 276 (1976); see generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wag-
es: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 99.
56. See generally HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 42, T 5.01.
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law and held that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on
imported property present in the taxing jurisdiction on tax day did
not violate any of the general goals of the Import-Export Clause.57
While admitting that the Clause did not distinguish between discrim-
inatory and nondiscriminatory imposts and duties,58 the Court re-
fused to read "imposts and duties" broadly to encompass the taxes at
issue in the case.59 The Court pointed out that "the Clause is not writ-
ten in terms of a broad prohibition of every 'tax.' "6 It contrasted the
specific language of Article I, Section 10, with the broader language of
Article I, Section 8, which authorized Congress "to 'lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.' "61 The Court concluded:
[S]ince prohibition of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxa-
tion would not further the objectives of the Import-Export Clause,
only the clearest constitutional mandate should lead us to con-
demn such taxation. The terminology employed in the Clause-
"Imposts or Duties"-is sufficiently ambiguous that we decline to
presume it was intended to embrace taxation that does not create
the evils the Clause was specifically intended to eliminate. 62
6. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[11o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."63 In the late 1930s, the Court began taking
an expansive view of those activities that qualify as interstate com-
merce. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., for example, the
Court recognized that Congress possesses the authority to regulate
seemingly intrastate activity that has "a close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce." 64 Similarly, in United States v. Darby,
57. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285-86. The Court described these three goals as follows:
[1] [The Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect
foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that
exclusive power; [2] import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of
the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and (3] har-
mony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their
crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other
States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States
not situated as favorably geographically.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 290.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 293-94.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
64. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
2014] 405
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the Court held that "[t]he power of Congress over interstate com-
merce . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect inter-
state commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end . ."65
In Darby, the Court utilized this view of the Commerce Clause to
uphold Congress's authority to regulate labor conditions via the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").66 When initially enacted, the FLSA
was applicable only to private economic activity, specifically exclud-
ing state and local government employers from its provisions.67 Over
time, however, Congress amended the statute so that it eventually
applied to state and local governments as well. 68 In National League
of Cities v. Usery, the Court struck down the amendments on the
ground that they violated state sovereignty and were thus outside
the scope of the Commerce Clause power. 9
Although not explicit in its decision, the Court in Usery seemed
concerned that Congress was utilizing the Court's prior decision rules
implementing the Commerce Clause in a way that enabled evasion of
other constitutional principles. Through its amendments to the
FLSA, Congress was impermissibly regulating the states and their
political subdivisions under the pretext of regulating commercial ac-
tivity. 0 To curb such evasion, the Court established a decision rule
that prohibited Congress from using its admittedly plenary Com-
merce Clause power "to force directly upon the States its choices as to
how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmen-
tal functions are to be made."7 As applied by subsequent decisions,
Usery thus created a standard-like balancing test focusing on the
type of federal regulation, the state/local function involved, and the
interests of both sovereigns.7 2 This test can be viewed, in other words,
as a type of AED.
65. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
66. Id. at 121-26.
67. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836 (1976) (discussing history of
the FLSA).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 851-52.
70. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 562 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (reading Usery as establishing a rule "for determining whether Commerce
Clause enactments transgress [i.e., evade] constitutional limitations imposed by the federal
nature of our system of government").
71. Usery, 426 U.S. at 855.
72. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981);
see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 561-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing Usery as standard-
like balancing test); Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (indicating that
Usery employed "balancing approach').
406 [Vol. 41:397
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Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Ass'n, the Court was presented with another opportunity to reaffirm
the AED-like decision rule from Usery. Instead, the Court explicitly
overruled Usery.13 The majority found that the Usery framework was
not only unworkable, but it was inconsistent with the respective
competencies of the legislative and judicial branches. 74 Without deny-
ing that Congress might attempt to push the bounds of its regulatory
powers, the Court now indicated that the chief means of protecting
the states lay in the structure and process of the federal political sys-
tem, rather than in the courts. "[W]e are convinced," wrote Justice
Blackmun for the Court, "that the fundamental limitation ... on the
Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process
rather than one of result."7 5
B. Anti-Anti-Evasion in Individual Rights and Liberties Cases
1. The Establishment Clause
Minnesota allowed parents to deduct certain educational expenses
on their state taxes. The deduction was available whether the chil-
dren attended public or private schools. Because parents whose chil-
dren attended private, sectarian schools benefitted disproportionate-
ly, the deduction was challenged as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.7 6 Central to the challenge was the argument that, despite the
deduction's facial neutrality, the primary beneficiaries of the deduc-
tion were religious schools, because public education was provided
free of charge.7 7 Upholding the tax deduction," then-Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that "[w]e need not consider [the establishment-in-effect
argument] in detail." 79 He continued:
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the
law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that
this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled stand-
ards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated. More-
73. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 538-47.
75. Id. at 554.
76. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983).
77. Id. at 400-01. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
the Court invalidated a similar New York law that provided tax relief to parents of paro-
chial school students alone. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
78. The Court concluded that the deduction had a secular purpose, did not impermis-
sibly advance religion, and did not excessively entangle the state with religion. Mueller,
463 U.S. at 394-400 (applying the prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
79. Id. at 401.
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over, the fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim
the tax relief to which they are entitled-under a facially neutral
statute-should be of little importance in determining the consti-
tutionality of the statute permitting such relief.8 o
In a more recent case, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organiza-
tion v. Winn," the Court held that Arizona taxpayers lacked standing
to challenge a state law permitting a tax deduction for contributions
to private school tuition organizations that provided scholarships for
students to attend secular and sectarian private schools in the state. 2
Under federal law, taxpayers generally don't have standing to chal-
lenge governmental action. 3 An exception was created in Flast v. Co-
hen for taxpayer challenges to government expenditures alleged to
violate the Establishment Clause.84 As the Winn Court explained,
Flast requires the satisfaction of two conditions for such taxpayer
standing. First, "there must be a 'logical link' between the plaintiffs
taxpayer status 'and the type of legislative enactment attacked.' "5
Second, "there must be 'a nexus' between the plaintiffs taxpayer sta-
tus and 'the precise nature of the constitutional infringement al-
leged.' "86 In Flast, the latter condition was satisfied by an "allegation
that Government funds had been spent on an outlay for religion in
contravention of the Establishment Clause."" Flast's exception, how-
ever, has been narrowed nearly to the vanishing point, and the Winn
Court was not inclined to reverse this narrowing.
Petitioners argued that the tax credit was akin to direct govern-
mental spending and that they should be deemed to have standing to
challenge the deduction.88 "A dissenter whose tax dollars are 'extract-
ed and spent,'" explained Justice Kennedy, "knows that he has in
some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in
violation of conscience." 9 By contrast,
[w]hen the government declines to impose a tax . . . there is no
such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged estab-
lishment. Any financial injury remains speculative. And awarding
80. Id.
81. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
82. Id. at 1440.
83. See generally 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (3d ed. & Supp. 2008) (describing citizen suits).
84. 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
85. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
86. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1447.
89. Id.
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some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain control
over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.o
Justice Kennedy thus concluded that "[wlhen Arizona taxpayers
choose to contribute to [student tuition organizations], they spend
their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents
or from other taxpayers."91
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent for herself and three other Justices
criticizing the majority's position and arguing that it facilitated naked
evasion of the taxpayer standing exception created in Flast.92 The ma-
jority's "novel distinction ... between appropriations and tax expend-
itures," she wrote,
has as little basis in principle as it has in our precedent. Cash
grants and targeted tax breaks are means of accomplishing the
same government objective-to provide financial support to select
individuals or organizations. Taxpayers who oppose state aid of
religion have equal reason to protest whether that aid flows from
the one form of subsidy or the other. Either way, the government
has financed the religious activity. And so either way, taxpayers
should be able to challenge the subsidy.9 3
2. Taxes as Takings
When Pittsburgh imposed a twenty percent gross receipts tax on
owners of private parking lots, the owners of the lots sued, alleging
that the tax destroyed their businesses and thus constituted an un-
compensated taking in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 4 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.95 First, the Court noted it "ha[d] consistently refused either
to undertake the task of passing on the 'reasonableness' of a tax that
otherwise is within the power ... of state legislative authorities, or to
hold that a tax is unconstitutional because it renders a business un-
profitable."96 Second, the Court identified problems with the state
court's claim that the tax was so high that it amounted to an unlaw-
ful confiscation of property. Not only was such a conclusion reserved
for "rare and special instances,"97 but the Pennsylvania court itself
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 370-73 (1974).
95. Id. at 372-73.
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id. at 374.
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had recognized that the tax was going to raise a significant amount
of revenue."9
Similar problems existed with the lower court's "takings-in-effect"
argument, which assumed that "a bona fide tax, if sufficiently bur-
densome, could be held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.""
The Court found this at odds with "the oft-repeated principle that the
judiciary should not infer a legislative attempt to exercise a forbidden
power in the form of a seeming tax from the fact, alone, that the tax
appears excessive or even so high as to threaten the existence of an
occupation or business." 00 The Court found no more appealing the
suggestion that "the ordinance loses its character as a tax . . . if the
taxing authority, directly or through an instrumentality enjoying var-
ious forms of tax exemption, competes with the taxpayer in a manner
thought to be unfair by the judiciary."' 0 Institutional competence
counseled against "the judiciary undertak[ing] to separate those taxes
that are too burdensome from those that are not," as well as engaging
in "judicial oversight of the terms and circumstances under which the
government or its tax-exempt instrumentalities may undertake to
compete with the private sector." 02
The Court's earlier decision in Leonard v. Earle03 provides an even
more pointed example of the refusal to second-guess a taxing measure
on the ground that it is pretext for, or has the same effect as, a tak-
ing. In Leonard, the Court considered a Maryland statute that re-
quired oyster packers to deliver to the state ten percent of the empty
oyster shells left over after the shucking process. The state planned to
place the empty shells back into the oyster beds to prevent their de-
struction and aid in their reproduction.104 The empty shells, however,
had commercial value to the packers, who could sell them for use in
road-making, fertilizer manufacturing, and chicken feed. 05 Thus, the
plaintiff packer refused to deliver the required shells and challenged
the statute as effecting an uncompensated taking of its property. 0 6
The Court unanimously rejected this challenge. Noting that the
state undoubtedly could have taxed the packers for a cash equivalent
to the value of the empty shells, the Court saw no meaningful differ-
ence in the state physically demanding the shells themselves. "[A]s
98. Id. at 375 ("It would have been difficult from any standpoint to have held that the
ordinance was in no sense a revenue measure.").
99. Id. at 376.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 279 U.S. 392 (1929).
104. Id. at 393-94.
105. Id. at 393.
106. Id. at 396.
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the packer lawfully could be required to pay that sum in money,"
wrote Justice McReynolds, "we think nothing in the Federal Consti-
tution prevents the State from demanding that he give up the same
per cent[age] of such shells."10 This was so for two primary reasons.
First, the Court viewed the form of the exaction-whether payable in
cash or in kind-to be of no material difference to the packer: "From
the packer's standpoint empty shells are but ordinary articles of
commerce, desirable because convertible into money."108 Additionally,
the Court indicated that the method by which a tax is payable-
including delivery of specific property-was a matter of legislative,
not judicial, competence: "The extent to which it [the power to tax]
shall be exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and
the mode in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within the dis-
cretion of the legislatures to which the States commit the exercise of
the power." 109
3. Racial Discrimination
When its public swimming pools were held to discriminate against
African Americans because they were white-only, the city of Jackson,
Mississippi transferred ownership of one to the YMCA and closed four
others.n0 The closure was challenged as an attempt to evade a lower
court's finding and an attempt to evade the Equal Protection Clause.
But the Court in Palmer v. Thompson concluded that there was no
constitutional violation. Responding to the argument that it was the
intent of the city, in closing the pools, to prevent their integration, the
Court replied that "no case in this Court has held that a legislative
act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of
the men who voted for it.""' While the Court conceded that there was
"[s]ome evidence" in the record that the decision to close the pools was
motivated by "ideological opposition to racial integration in swimming
pools,"112 there was also evidence that the city concluded that inte-
grated pools could not be operated safely or economically." 3 Justice
Black concluded:
It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the "sole"
or "dominant" motivation behind the choices of a group of legisla-
tors. Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial at-
tempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its sup-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 397.
110. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1971).
111. Id. at 224.
112. Id. at 224-25.
113. Id. at 225.
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porters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than be-
cause of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as
soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons. 114
The Court distinguished cases like Gomillion v. Lightfoot on the
grounds that the primary basis on which those laws were invalidated
was their discriminatory effects." 5 Here the effects fell on black and
white alike, according to the Court."6
Justice White, dissenting, responded that "[s]tate action predicat-
ed solely on opposition to a lawful court order to desegregate is a de-
nial of equal protection of the laws."" 7 He questioned the "substantial
evidence" credited by the majority that the pools were closed because
they could not be operated economically if integrated.", But for a
court order to open the pools to all regardless of race, they would have
remained open, he concluded; therefore, the decision to close them
was motivated by opposition to integration and could not be squared
with the Equal Protection Clause."19
Given Palmer v. Thompson's emphasis on the need to prove effects
and its skepticism about the ability or propriety of discerning the
purpose or intent behind an official act, there is an irony in the
Court's decision a few years later in Washington v. Davis.120 Unsuc-
cessful applicants for positions on the District of Columbia police
force claimed that the use of a qualifying exam for police recruits vio-
lated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment 2 ' be-
cause it had a disproportionate impact on African-American appli-
cants.122 The court of appeals concluded that such a disparate impact
was sufficient to state a claim for race discrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, regardless of the lack of discriminatory intent.12 3
Justice White, for the Court, reversed. "[Olur cases," he wrote,
"have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act,
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. There was evidence, however, that the pool transferred to the YMCA continued
to operate on a segregated basis. Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 265 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 259.
119. Id. at 270-71.
120. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
121. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has an equal protection component that binds the federal
government as the Equal Protection Clause does the states).
122. According to the Court, four times as many African-American applicants failed the
test as did white applicants. Davis, 426 U.S. at 237.
123. Id.
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pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact."124 To the contrary, the Court's cases, he argued,
clearly demonstrated the need to show that official action was moti-
vated by an intent to discriminate,125 either by reference to express
language in a statute, or by inference from "the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another."12 6 The Court explained away
Palmer v. Thompson's opposite claim-that invidious purpose could
never form the basis for invalidating official acts-by explaining that
in that case the Court
[a]ccept[ed] the finding that the pools were closed to avoid violence
and economic loss . .. [and] rejected the argument that the aban-
donment of this service was inconsistent with the outstanding de-
segregation decree and that the otherwise seemingly permissible
ends served by the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrat-
ing that racially invidious motivations had prompted the city
council's action.12 7
Were disparate impact sufficient to invalidate a law, the Court
worried, such a holding "would raise serious questions about, and
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regu-
latory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the
poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white."128 The
Court concluded that nothing about the decision to use a screening
test or its administration indicated an intent to discriminate against
African-American applicants-indeed, it found that the District of
Columbia had gone out of its way to encourage African Americans to
apply for positions on the police force.12 9
The Court had occasion again to consider the requirement for
discriminatory intent the next term in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.13 0 In that case, the Court
considered a local zoning decision to prohibit a multi-family housing
development, which the plaintiffs alleged had a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.' 3 1 The majority reiterated that "[p]roof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause."13 2 It then concluded that the evidence
124. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 239-42.
126. Id. at 242.
127. Id. at 242-43.
128. Id. at 248.
129. Id. at 245-47.
130. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
131. Id. at 255-60.
132. Id. at 265.
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showed that city officials, in denying the petition to rezone, "focused
almost exclusively on the zoning aspects" of the planned housing
project, rather than on the probable racial composition of the
project's ultimate residents. 3 3 As such, the plaintiffs could not show
that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the city's
decision, ending the constitutional inquiry and leaving the lower
court's conclusion of discriminatory effect "without independent
constitutional significance." 134
4. Abortion Funding
Following Roe v. Wade,135 in which the Court held that a woman's
choice to terminate her pregnancy before the third trimester was a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, states
and the federal government restricted conditions under which abor-
tions would be subsidized by the government. The Court upheld Con-
necticut's decision to cover only "medically necessary" abortions-
while funding childbirth-under its Medicaid program in Maher v.
Roe." 6 The respondents maintained that the refusal to subsidize
abortion constituted a denial of the right. The Court disagreed. Jus-
tice Powell wrote that Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases in which
regulations of abortion were invalidated "recognize a constitutionally
protected interest 'in making certain kinds of important decisions'
free from governmental compulsion.""' By contrast,
[t]he Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or oth-
erwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a con-
sequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues
as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she de-
sires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alter-
native, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has im-
posed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already
there. The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cas-
es, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is nei-
ther created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation. 3 8
The dissent accused the majority of "distressing insensitivity" to
the plight of poor women who "will feel they have no choice but to
carry their pregnancies to term because the State will pay for the as-
sociated medical services, even though they would have chosen to
133. Id. at 270.
134. Id. at 270-71.
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
137. Id. at 473.
138. Id. at 474.
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have abortions if the State had also provided funds for that proce-
dure." 39 The decision, the dissent alleged, "seriously erodes the prin-
ciples that Roe . . . announced to guide the determination of what
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental
right . . "140 Justice Brennan also argued that the decision was in-
consistent with cases involving other fundamental rights, in which
the Court had "found - . . infringements . .. not limited to outright
denials of those rights,"'41 but also cases in which the government im-
posed "restraints that make exercise of those rights more difficult." 42
At the federal level, the "Hyde Amendment" prohibited the use of
federal funds to pay for abortions unless the life of the woman was in
danger, or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 1 43 This exclu-
sion was challenged in Harris v. McRae; as in Maher, the Court up-
held the exclusions, finding that failing to subsidize abortion did not
deprive women of the right to an abortion. For the Court, Justice Pot-
ter Stewart wrote that the Hyde Amendment, like Connecticut's regu-
lations, "place[d] no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman
who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of un-
equal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encour-
ages alternative activity deemed in the public interest."144 Indigency,
which the government did not create, produced the inability to pro-
cure an abortion for poor women. If there were a right to subsidized
abortion, then other rights recognized by the Court-the right to use
contraceptives or send children to private schools-could likewise be
read to require government subsidies to the poor to enable them
meaningfully to enjoy those rights.145 That result "would mark a dras-
tic change in our understanding of the Constitution," wrote Stewart. 46
IV. WHY THE COURT DECLINES TO CREATE ANTI-EVASION DOCTRINES
The cases described in Part III establish that the Court regularly
declines invitations by parties to create AEDs in a substantial num-
ber of cases involving structures and powers as well as civil liberties.
But simply establishing the fact does not answer the more important
139. Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 484.
141. Id. at 487.
142. Id.
143. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
144. Id. at 315.
145. Id. at 317-18.
146. Id. at 318. Justice Brennan dissented, rehearsing his earlier complaints about the
majority's "failure to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of
governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effec-
tively as can an outright denial of those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions."
Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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question: Why does the Court create AEDs in some areas but not in
others? Why will the Court treat discriminatory effects against inter-
state commerce as sufficient to invalidate state or local action, but not
when official action has a disparate impact on one racial group? 14 7
Why did the Court create the regulatory takings doctrine that pre-
vents de facto takings effected by legislation, while permitting Con-
gress to evade the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" restriction by
continuously extending the length of copyright?148
Because a primary function of AEDs is to optimize constitutional
principles and to prevent officials from observing the form of doctrinal
rules at the expense of substance, it is tempting to conclude that in
the cases discussed above, the Court simply isn't interested in opti-
mizing the particular constitutional principles at issue. It is also
tempting to throw up one's hands and conclude that the Court will
create AEDs when it creates them, and will not create them when it
does not.
In this Part, however, we hope to avoid either cynicism or tautolo-
gy in our examination of this question. A close reading of the Court's
reasoning in cases rejecting calls for AEDs reveals that the Court en-
gages in anti-anti-evasion for one or more related reasons: (1) con-
cerns about institutional competence expressed as a felt need for def-
erence to another branch to permit the allegedly evasive activity; (2) a
perceived distinction between conduct proscribed by the Constitution
and the official action alleged to evade that proscription; (3) a reluc-
tance to frame AEDs based on impermissible purpose alone; and (4)
concerns about the consequences of over-enforcement of a constitu-
tional principle through the use of AEDs. We find these reasons in-
complete, however, because similar claims could be made about cases
in which the Court does create AEDs. In Part V, we hypothesize that
cases in which the Court declines to create AEDs share common
characteristics that, though not remarked upon by the Court, explain
its decision to engage in anti-anti-evasion. Here, however, we address
the Court's stated reasons for such a decision.
A. Institutional Competence and Deference
Perhaps the most common reason articulated by the Court for de-
clining to create an AED is that doing so will upset traditional bal-
ance of power arrangements or otherwise extend the judicial function
beyond its proper boundaries. In several of the cases described above,
the Court expressed a sense that either it ought to defer to historic
147. Compare Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1789-90, with supra notes 110-34 and
accompanying text.
148. Compare Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1792-93, with supra notes 25-34 and
accompanying text.
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practice permitting the alleged evasion or it lacked the institutional
competence to design an appropriate AED. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, for
example, the Court deferred both to historic practice retroactively ex-
tending the time for existing copyrights and to Congress's decision to
do so in that case. Noting that the statute at issue "reflects judgments
of a kind Congress typically makes,"14 9 the majority "stressed . .. that
it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pur-
sue the Copyright Clause's objectives."s 0
The Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Trans-
it Authority provides another example of this rationale. In overruling
its prior decision that the FLSA could not apply to state and local
government employers, the Court noted that applying that rule had
required difficult line drawing concerning the nature of the federal
system, as well as about what functions and services government was
supposed to provide. Recognizing that it was "an open question how
well equipped" judicial officers are to make these determinations, the
Court explained its reluctance to interject the judiciary into matters
of public policy: "Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'tradi-
tional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."11
Overruling its prior decisions to the contrary was required, the Court
went on, by the "[d]ue respect . . . [the Court owed to] the reach of
congressional power within the federal system."152
Similar statements can be found throughout the Court's anti-anti-
evasion opinions.153 The refusal to consider a "taxes-as-takings" AED,
for example, is grounded in an unwillingness or inability to engage in
the line drawing necessary to distinguish "true" taxes from confisca-
tory taxes that really are takings.15 4 In both Mueller v. Allen and
149. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003).
150. Id. at 212.
151. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1985).
152. Id. at 557.
153. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("Probably few persons, prior to this case, would have imagined that cities could be forced
by five lifetime judges to construct or refurbish swimming pools which they chose not to
operate for any reason, sound or unsound."); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577,
587-88 (1937) ("A legislature has a wide range of choice in classifying and limiting the sub-
jects of taxation... . Such questions of fiscal policy will not be answered by a court.").
154. See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 376 (1974):
This approach would demand not only that the judiciary undertake to separate
those taxes that are too burdensome from those that are not, but also would re-
quire judicial oversight of the terms and circumstances under which the gov-
ernment or its tax-exempt instrumentalities may undertake to compete with
the private sector. The clear teaching of prior cases is that this is not a task
that the Due Process Clause demands of or permits to the judiciary. We are not
now inclined to chart a different course.
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Washington v. Davis, the Court was equally wary of its ability to fash-
ion rules inferring constitutional impermissibility from statistical ev-
idence of actual benefit or burden, as well as the propriety of courts
even engaging in that exercise.1 5 And in the abortion funding cases,
the Court emphasized that the legislature, and not the judiciary, was
the proper forum for balancing the sensitive and competing policy in-
terests that these cases typically involve.15 6
B. Constitutionally Significant Distinctions
Another common reason for declining to create an AED is that the
complained-of action, to the Court, is not really evasion at all. The
Court will point to something analytically distinctive about the action
that renders it not merely an observance of form and disregard of the
substance of a constitutional principle. Nowhere is this clearer than
the Court's repeated refusal to treat tax expenditures as direct spend-
ing, either for purposes of the DCCD or, more recently, in its contin-
ued narrowing of the Flast v. Cohen exception to the bar on taxpayer
standing. In DCCD cases, the Court repeatedly has suggested that
"there is a constitutionally significant difference between subsidies
and tax exemptions."1'5 7 Likewise, in the context of taxpayer standing,
the Court has emphasized a constitutional distinction between tax
credits and direct expenditures, even though the economic conse-
quences of the two devices may be similar.158 These distinctions, for
the Court, make a genuine difference that influences the ultimate
make-up of constitutional doctrine.
In similar fashion, the Court has consistently regarded the deci-
sion not to subsidize a particular activity-abortion, for example-as
being fundamentally different than a legislative decision to place a
155. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) ("Such an approach would scarcely
provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled
standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated."); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (explaining that such a rule would involve "a more probing judi-
cial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution").
156. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (explaining that public funding of
abortion is a decision "entrusted under the Constitution to Congress, not the courts," and
that "[i]t is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the balance of
competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy"); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) ("The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic
abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply
divided.... [The appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.").
157. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590 (1997);
see also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (distinguishing a "pure
subsidy," which "ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce," from the offending
tax expenditure under consideration); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
278 (1988) ("Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the
DCCD]; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.").
158. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
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(non-financial) obstacle in the path of a woman who wishes to termi-
nate her pregnancy. 59 The inability to secure an unsubsidized abor-
tion is caused not by state action, but rather because of the poverty
itself. Again, that distinction carries a real difference, according to
the Court-the state presumably did not place the woman in a state
of indigency and thus cannot be said to be imposing the restriction or
proscription. Under these circumstances, the indigent woman is left
"with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all." 6 1
Consider also the different ways that the Court treats purpose
tests. We will address this in more detail below, but here it suffices to
note that the Court treats claims of improper motive as meaningfully
different depending on the nature of the motive in question. Explain-
ing its requirement for proof of racially discriminatory intent in the
equal protection context, for example, the Court distinguished be-
tween racial animus and other legislative motivations:
Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the
"dominant" or "primary" one. In fact, it is because legislators
and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numer-
ous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing
the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness
or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another
competing consideration.' 6'
Even though the Court often views allegations of improper motive
with suspicion, racial motivation is sufficiently different that it war-
rants distinctive constitutional treatment.162
Finally, the Court's insistence in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
that a tax on use is not the same as a tariff raising the costs of impor-
tation into a state,163 and its differentiation in Sabri v. United States
between federal spending as a trigger to punish individual conduct
and federal spending as a means of overpowering state public policy
choices,16 4 provide yet more examples of the Court finding constitu-
tionally significant distinctions that preclude the crafting of an AED.
159. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
160. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
161. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(footnote omitted).
162. See id. at 265-66.
163. 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937).
164. 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
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C. Skepticism About Purpose
As hinted at in the prior Part, the Court has displayed an ambiva-
lent relationship with purpose tests throughout the years. On the one
hand, it frequently uses purpose or intent tests to flush out unconsti-
tutional actions that were somehow concealed.165 But on the other,
the Court is often wary of relying on impermissible purpose alone to
invalidate official action, as Palmer v. Thompson, Eldred, and
Henneford showed.'66 The Court's ambivalence stems from, as critics
have argued, a reluctance to accuse another branch of legislating
in bad faith, the difficulty in assigning motive or intent to a
multimember body, the differences between the judicial and legisla-
tive functions, and the possibility that offending legislation will simp-
ly be reenacted after somehow purging itself of the effects of the
malign purpose.167
It is interesting, then, that Washington v. Davis required a show-
ing of discriminatory intent to prove a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. In addition to its conviction that racial motivation is sig-
nificantly distinct from other types of intent, 68 the Court seemed con-
cerned that holding discrimination-in-effect to be sufficient for invali-
dating official action would result in a flood of litigation calling into
question innumerable federal and state policies.'6 9
D. Consequentialism and the Failure to Create AEDs
Finally, the Court expresses a reluctance to create AEDs when it
believes the consequences of adopting a particular AED will destabi-
lize or dramatically alter constitutional doctrine. The Court worried
in Davis, for example, that permitting disparate impact claims for
race discrimination might end up permitting race to serve as a proxy
for wealth, thus calling into question scores of laws that adversely
affect minority groups whose members tend to be less wealthy.170
Similar concerns-that to equate a refusal to subsidize a right was
tantamount to infringing that same right-led the Court to reject the
165. See Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1788-93 (describing purpose and effects
tests as types of AEDs). See generally Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Discriminatory
Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the assessment of legis-
lative purpose in the practice of judicial review).
166. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2003); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 224 (1971); Henneford, 300 U.S. at 586.
167. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225.
168. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66; supra text accompanying note 161.
169. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-43, 248 (1976); supra text accompany-
ing notes 124-28.
170. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (explaining that such a rule "would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes").
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creation of an AED in the abortion funding cases. The Justices were
concerned that so holding would constitutionalize vast swaths of the
welfare state-at least those parts that impacted constitutional
rights. That, in turn, would convert constitutional guarantees from
"negative" liberties into positive ones, a move that was too radical for
the Court."' "'[The Constitution,"' the Court explained in Maher,
"'does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.' "172
Considerations about disturbing existing constitutional frame-
works also played a significant role in the Court's decision in Garcia.
In overruling the AED previously created in Usery, the Court sug-
gested that its prior rule ran the risk of upsetting the constitutional
balance between federal and state authority. Noting that "the sover-
eignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself,"73 the major-
ity explained that "State sovereign interests . . . are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed-
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."174
Implicit in the Court's decision not to create AEDs is its judgment
that optimizing the enforcement of constitutional values-what we
described as the main benefit of AEDs'"6-is not the Court's raison
d'itre in all constitutional cases. Other values-institutional compe-
tence, deference to past practice, separation of powers concerns-
weigh on the Court's implementation of constitutional provisions.
And yet, to us, the Court's articulated reasons for not creating AEDs
don't tell the whole story. Many of the reasons discussed above are
arguably present in cases in which the Court created or applied
AEDs. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, have long com-
plained that judicial enforcement of the DCCD-especially its balanc-
ing prong-is beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary. 7 6
171. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) ("To hold otherwise would mark a
drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution."); cf. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 228
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("To find an equal protection issue in every closing of public
swimming pools, tennis courts, or golf courses would distort beyond reason the meaning of
[the Equal Protection Clause]" and would "constitutionally 'locko in' the public sponsor so
that [the service or facility] may not be dropped .... .").
172. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972)).
173. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985).
174. Id. at 552.
175. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1797.
176. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 351 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (complaining that the DCCD reflects only the
policy preferences of majorities in particular cases, urging the doctrine's total abandon-
ment); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (complaining that balancing in DCCD cases requires comparing incommen-
surable values; requiring courts to "judg[e] whether a particular line is longer than a par-
ticular rock is heavy").
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Academic and judicial critics of the Court's regulatory takings cases
have complained that it ignores both historical precedent and salient
differences between regulation and exercises of eminent domain.'7
And lamenting the consequences of over-enforcing constitutional
principles through the use of AEDs is a familiar trope in dissenting
opinions.178 The question is still left hanging: What makes the Court
less inclined to create AEDs in certain cases? Close inspection of the
cases discussed above reveals a common thread that, we argue in
Part V, explains the Court's reluctance to create AEDs.
V. AEDS AND ANTI-ANTI-EVASION:
TOWARD A THEORY OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT
As we recognized previously, AEDs tend to take the form of stand-
ards backstopping previously created rules to implement constitu-
tional principles. Their function is prophylactic-they make it more
difficult for officials to elevate form over substance, thereby frustrat-
ing covert violations of the Constitution. AEDs, then, over-enforce
certain provisions. As we have pointed out in this Article, however,
the Court doesn't always create AEDs. Why?
In reviewing the cases in which the Court has declined to create
an AED, we are struck by a common thread: each deals to some ex-
tent either with governmental decisions to tax or spend or with the
provision of subsidized goods or services. This characteristic is obvi-
ous in a number of the decisions discussed in Part III. South Dakota
v. Dole and Sabri v. United States, for example, directly concern con-
gressional spending authority. In similar fashion, the taxes-as-
takings cases straightforwardly present issues about the govern-
ment's power to tax. The DCCD cases involve either taxes or subsi-
dies, as do the Establishment Clause and abortion funding cases.
177. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036-61 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Mean-
ing of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000).
178. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
314 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority's extension of the state action
doctrine, Justice Thomas complained that
if the majority's new entwinement test develops in future years, it could affect
many organizations that foster activities, enforce rules, and sponsor extracur-
ricular competition among high schools-not just in athletics, but in such di-
verse areas as agriculture, mathematics, music, marching bands, forensics, and
cheerleading. Indeed, this entwinement test may extend to other organizations
that are composed of, or controlled by, public officials or public entities, such as
firefighters, policemen, teachers, cities, or counties.
Id. at 314-15; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing con-
cern that "the Court's new [takings] policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the
present case").
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Skeptical readers, however, might wonder about our characteriza-
tion of the other cases. What about Eldred? Washington v. Davis? Ar-
lington Heights? Palmer v. Thompson? What do race discrimination
cases and a case about the Copyright Clause have to do with taxing
and spending decisions? First, consider that "[a] copyright enables its
owner to exclude competition from copiers, and so if there are no good
substitutes for his work he will obtain a monopoly profit . .. by being
able to charge a price in excess of his marginal cost (the cost of mak-
ing an additional copy)." 7 9 This monopoly is granted by the govern-
ment and results in a subsidy-in the form of the monopoly profits-
from consumers of copyrighted works to their producers. The decision
whether and to what extent to grant such privileges to a select group
strikes us as consistent with other, more straightforward decisions to
tax or spend or subsidize certain goods and services.
Washington v. Davis is a little different. On the surface, there is
no connection between a disparate impact race discrimination claim
and taxing and spending decisions. But in the opinion, the Court very
quickly tumbled to the fact that race was often a proxy for wealth,
and that claims of race discrimination could be lodged against laws
that really discriminate on the basis of wealth. That result, the Court
pointed out, "would raise serious questions about, and perhaps inval-
idate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to
the average black than to the more affluent white."180 The zoning
regulations at issue in Arlington Heights seem to fall squarely within
the ambit of this concern, and scholars have noted that such regula-
tions often have the economic effect of subsidizing some portion of the
population at the expense of others.'"' Invalidating these regulations
without evidence of an invidious purpose, the Court seemed to sug-
gest, would be tantamount to deciding if and how land use subsidies
should be meted out, a decision better left to the political branches.
Similarly, the Palmer majority worried about "five lifetime judges"
forcing cities "to construct or refurbish swimming pools which they
choose not to operate for any reason, sound or unsound." 18 2
More important than what subjects the cases involve, though, is
why these subjects seem to matter. What makes the Court more like-
ly to reject anti-evasion arguments in these types of cases as opposed
to others? Though our conclusions here are tentative, our working
179. Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act:
Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial Technique in Eldred v Ashcroft, 2003 SUP. CT. REV.
143, 146.
180. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclu-
sionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 31-32 (1996).
182. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971).
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hypothesis is that the Court-at least implicitly, though sometimes
explicitly-believes that there are robust political protections in
these cases that sufficiently police the constitutional boundaries and
prevent governmental overreaching. We stress that the Court's
judgment here is a comparative one. It is evident that sometimes the
political process does not monitor the boundaries effectively. The
point is that, in the Court's judgment, it does so most of the time bet-
ter than a court would be able to do. Or, put differently, the costs of
optimization through the use of AEDs (which would probably result
in some over-enforcement of constitutional norms) are greater than the
risk of under-enforcement occasioned by the lack of an available AED.
Consider again the repeated references in the Court's opinions to
the limits of its own institutional competence. These statements not
only suggest that the Court perceives questions regarding optimal
levels of taxing and spending to be outside its purview, but they also
carry the additional message that the policing of those limits lies
with other bodies that can discharge that function better than the
judiciary. By ceding the enforcement role to these other institutions,
moreover, the Court signals its confidence that the protections provid-
ed by the political processes are sufficient to prevent grave abuses. 83
Sometimes, as in Garcia, the Court makes this point explicitly:
"[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that
our system provides through state participation in federal govern-
mental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly
burden the States will not be promulgated." 84 More typically, the
Court implies it, as it did in Eldred's recounting of the various inter-
ests that participated in the passage of the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act,18 followed by its conclusion that the retroactive application
of the term extension was a "rational enactment" reflecting "congres-
sional determinations and policy judgments" that the Court refused
to second-guess.186 The majority chided Justice Breyer for his sugges-
tion that a new three-part test be applied to the Act, commenting
that "'it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has la-
183. Cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1992) (noting, in a tax case, that "the
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident deci-
sions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985); see also id.
at 552-53 (discussing "[t]he effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving ...
States' interests"); id. at 554 ("[WMe are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is
one of process rather than one of result.").
185. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 & nn.11-13, 207 nn.14-15 (2003).
186. Id. at 208.
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bored to achieve.' "187 One hears a similar admonition in the Court's
refusal to allow the taxpayers standing to sue over the tax expendi-
tures in Winn. "Few exercises of the judicial power," the Court con-
cluded, "are more likely to undermine public confidence in the neu-
trality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court
in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to
invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them.""
There is a forum for disputes such as these, the Court seems to say; it
isn't a judicial one, but is one that can be counted upon to do a passa-
ble job preventing abuses. "We should not forget," the Court cau-
tioned in Maher v. Roe, "that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of
the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts.' "189
By contrast, cases in which the Court has created AEDs feature
clues that the Court is worried that the process protections to moni-
tor official abuse either do not exist or could be expected to severely
underperform relative to judicial enforcement. For example, regula-
tory takings opinions, an area in which the Court routinely employs
AEDs,190 often express doubt that process protections are robust
enough to uphold the constitutional principle enshrined in the Tak-
ings Clause. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,1'9 which many con-
sider to be the genesis of the Court's regulatory takings doctrine, Jus-
tice Holmes directly called into question the efficacy of political safe-
guards when it comes to protecting private property from public en-
croachment. Noting that the Takings Clause presupposes the exist-
ence of a public purpose, he pointed out that it nevertheless requires
the payment of just compensation to the property owner, regardless
of how important the public purpose may be. 19 2 "When this seemingly
absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power," he
continued, "the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disap-
pears."193 More recently, the Court has made clear that its regulatory
takings jurisprudence is grounded in the idea of proper burden dis-
tribution, "bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
187. Id. at 205 n.10 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
188. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
189. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (quoting Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
190. See Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1792-93 (discussing regulatory takings doc-
trine as example of AED); see also id. at 1795 (noting that "the Court's entire regulatory
takings jurisprudence serves as an elaborate body of AEDs").
191. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
192. Id. at 415.
193. Id.
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borne by the public as a whole."194 Implicit in this justification is the
notion that the political process cannot be trusted fairly to apportion
public burdens where "other people's" property is involved. As one
state court has noted in applying the Supreme Court's takings deci-
sions, it is "entirely possible that the government could 'gang up' on
particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents
would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would
otherwise bear were shifted to others.""'9
The Court's dormant Commerce Clause opinions frequently sound
a similar theme. In explaining why the federal government was em-
powered to regulate interstate commerce, Justice Cardozo famously
referred to the Confederation Era experience of "the mutual jeal-
ousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers
and other economic retaliation" that suppressed competition among
the states.9 6 The reason for the involvement of the Court in invali-
dating state laws that give in to the temptation to discriminate (as
opposed to leaving matters for congressional regulation) is the sense
that the offending state and local laws "are individually too petty, too
diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard
pressed with more urgent matters."'9 7 For the Court to stay its hand,
Justice Robert Jackson later concluded, "would allow the states to
establish the restraints and let commerce struggle for Congressional
action to make it free."9
The decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy further illus-
trates the point.99 Even though the tax in that case was facially neu-
tral, applying to in-state and out-of-state producers alike, the reve-
194. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
195. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex.
2004). The link between the Takings Clause and the Court's takings decisions, on the one
hand, and political process failure, on the other, has been noted by several scholars. See,
e.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Develop-
ment Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1863-65 (2010) (discussing
process failure in context of land use exactions); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 855
(1995) (positing that remedying process failure was original purpose of the Takings
Clause); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(relating takings protections to notions of political transparency and accountability).
196. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
197. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 401.
199. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), which struck down a state
taxing scheme under the DCCD, likewise illustrates that there is nothing inherently magi-
cal about taxing and spending decisions in and of themselves. Rather, it is the Court's as-
sessment that these cases generally provide sufficient political protections that is the driv-
ing factor. In cases where that assessment is shown to be false, even with regard to tax and
spend measures, the Court will intervene.
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nues raised from the tax were distributed only to in-state businesses. 2 00
This feature caused the constitutional infirmity, and for the Court,
the problem was rooted directly in the lack of political safeguards:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue
here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on inter-
state commerce, in part because "[t]he existence of major in-state
interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse." However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is cou-
pled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State's
political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legisla-
tive abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would oth-
erwise lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.201
The Court thus saw in the tax-plus-subsidy scheme a potential pro-
cess failure similar to the one articulated above in the context of reg-
ulatory takings. Given the incentives for in-state producers to "gang
up" on their out-of-state counterparts, the political process would be
unlikely to provide adequate protections, making judicial interven-
tion more necessary.202
Thus, it appears to us that the Court largely views the political
process as typically better-equipped to safeguard constitutional
principles in cases that involve taxing and spending decisions
than in cases involving other types of regulation. Concomitantly,
because of the existence of these process protections, the Court is
more likely to decline the invitation to create an AED in the former
cases as opposed to the latter. But where political safeguards are in-
adequate, even taxing and spending measures will come under
heightened scrutiny.
A final piece of evidence in support of these conclusions is provid-
ed by the Court's recent decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, which was
handed down as we were finishing this Article. Chief Justice Rob-
erts's opinion for the Court upholding the individual mandate did so
not on Commerce Clause grounds, but on the ground that the pay-
ment incurred by individuals for not purchasing insurance was a
200. Id. at 188.
201. Id. at 200 (alteration in original) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)).
202. This, of course, raises the question why direct subsidies to in-state interests are
constitutionally permissible when similar tax expenditures are not. Although full treat-
ment of that issue is beyond our scope, we note that several commentators have explained
the difference on just the same terms we emphasize here-i.e., tax expenditures are less
transparent than direct subsidies and, therefore, are less likely to be effectively monitored
through the political process. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 37, at 984-86; J. Clifton Flem-
ing, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International
Dimension, 27 VA. TAX. REV. 437, 481-83 (2008); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing
Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1016-17 (2011). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits"
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998) (arguing
that the two devices should be treated as constitutionally equivalent in many cases).
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permissible exercise of Congress's taxing power. 2 03 Opponents of the
mandate argued-and most courts agreed-that the "shared respon-
sibility payment" was in truth an unconstitutional "penalty," not a
valid use of Congress's taxing power.204 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, suggesting that the mandated payment was not a pretextual
imposition of an impermissible penalty, but a real tax.205
Throughout this portion of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts em-
phasized the protections built in to prevent abuses. He noted that, in
addition to persons exempted from payment, the amount itself is
capped: "for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the
price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more."2 06 Moreo-
ver, Congress "bar[red] the IRS from using several of its normal en-
forcement tools, such as criminal prosecutions and levies." 20 7 He also
stressed that the Act need not be read to make the failure to pur-
chase insurance unlawful: "Neither the Act nor any other law attach-
es negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, be-
yond requiring a payment to the IRS."2 08 Because an estimated four
million people per year are expected to forgo insurance and make the
payment, and because "Congress apparently regards such extensive
failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable," that "suggests that
Congress did not think it was creating four million outlaws."20 9 In
short, for the majority, the political process that produced the man-
date incorporated safeguards against its abuse, and these legislative
protections adequately policed the constitutional boundary demarcat-
ing a permissible tax from a pretextual one. As such, the Court ap-
parently saw little reason for further, judicially created precautions.
203. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) ("The
Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not
obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax."). This portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion, Part III.C, was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, and thus constituted the opinion of the Court.
204. Though we did not discuss the taxing power in our earlier article, the tax/penalty
distinction is suggestive of a pretext AED. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922) (holding that Congress may not expand its power by
labeling a severe penalty a "tax"); Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1780-84 (discussing
pretext AEDs).
205. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (suggesting indicia of a tax is a functional inquiry; em-
phasizing "practical characteristics" of a tax: (1) whether it raised revenue without impos-
ing an excessive burden on the payer; (2) the presence or absence of a scienter requirement;
and (3) which government agency possessed responsibility for collection); see also supra
notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing refusal to create or apply AEDs because of
the Court's perception of constitutionally significant distinctions).
206. Id. at 2595-96.
207. Id. at 2580; see also id. at 2596 (noting that "the payment is collected solely by the
IRS through the normal means of taxation-except that the Service is not allowed to use
those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction" (emphasis in original)).
208. Id. at 2597.
209. Id.
[Vol. 41:397428
ANTI-ANTI-EVASION
More support comes from Roberts's discussion of the Medicaid ex-
pansion. Under the Act, Medicaid was dramatically expanded from
requiring states "to cover only certain discrete categories of needy
individuals-pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind,
the elderly, and the disabled" to forcing them "to cover all individuals
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal
poverty line" by 2014.210 The coverage, moreover, had to meet federal-
ly mandated minimum standards to enable individuals to comply
with the mandate's requirements. States that refused to comply with
the mandated expansion lost all federal Medicaid funds.2 1 1 Seven
Justices thought that this "gun to the head ,"212 in the Chief Justice's
phrase, was unconstitutionally "coercive" and went beyond Con-
gress's power to attach conditions to money that it offers to states. 2 18
At first blush, the Court's deployment of an "anti-coercion" AED in
a spending matter would seem to create problems for our thesis. 2 14 A
close reading of the various opinions, however, tends to confirm our
working hypothesis. The seven members of the Court who voted to
invalidate the penalty for refusing to embrace Medicaid's expansion
on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally coercive were employ-
ing an AED previously suggested by the Dole Court, but one that had
remained dormant. Consistent with our hypothesis, the Court aban-
doned its usual anti-anti-evasion position-even though this case in-
volved spending-because it perceived the typical political safeguards
as absent or having been severely compromised. The Court thought
that the dramatic expansion of Medicaid represented a change in the
nature of the program, not merely a change in degree. When coupled
with the threatened loss of all existing Medicaid funds, states could
not realistically escape the federal yoke by simply declining the
funds; they were presented with an all-or-nothing proposition.
Roberts's opinion began by linking the anti-coercion rule for condi-
tional spending with the constitutional principle underlying the anti-
commandeering principle2 1 1: political accountability. "Permitting the
210. Id. at 2601.
211. Id. at 2603.
212. Id. at 2604 ("[T]he financial 'inducement' Congress has chosen is much more than
'relatively mild encouragement'-it is a gun to the head.").
213. Id. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2662 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("If the anticoercion rule does not apply in this
case, then there is no such rule.").
214. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text (describing the Court's lack of inter-
est in articulating criteria for "coercive" spending conditions as an example of anti-anti-
evasion); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1783-84 (discussing Dole's suggestion
that spending conditions could be so onerous as to be coercive and, thus, unconstitutional,
as a possible-if inchoate-AED).
215. The anti-commandeering principle prohibits the federal government from forcing
state legislatures or executive branch officials to implement a federal program. Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal pro-
gram would threaten the political accountability key to our federal
system," Roberts wrote. 216 He explained that accountability is not
threatened when "a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situa-
tion, state officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choos-
ing to accept or refuse the federal offer."117 Without that choice, how-
ever, "the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without ac-
countability"-indeed, the danger to the federal system is greater be-
cause "Congress can use [the spending] power to implement federal
policy it could not impose directly under its enumerated powers."2 18
When the process works as it should, it provides ample safeguards
for state interests, and no judicial intervention is called for. "In the
typical case," the Chief Justice wrote, "we look to the States to defend
their prerogatives by adopting 'the simple expedient of not yielding'
to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the
federal policies as their own."2 19 He added wryly that "[t]he States are
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act
like it."2 20
Two features of the Medicaid expansion, however, suggested that
Congress had deliberately short-circuited these safeguards, warrant-
ing application of the anti-coercion AED. First, the Act dramatically
expanded the scope of Medicaid both in terms of eligible persons as
well as the menu of services states were required to offer.221 Second, a
state's refusal to participate in the expansion would not merely ren-
der it ineligible for new federal money, but would also forfeit all exist-
ing Medicaid funding. 222 This "gun to the head" went far beyond
South Dakota v. Dole's2 23 withholding of five percent of highway
funds.2 24 Because of the overall loss to a state's budget, Chief Justice
Roberts concluded, states had no real choice but to accept the expan-
sion of the program and the money that came with it, which was like-
ly the reason Congress designed the program as it did. 22 5
216. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
217. Id. at 2602-03.
218. Id. at 2603.
219. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2605-06.
222. Id. at 2603.
223. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
224. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
225. Id. at 2606 ("[The manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that
while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it
recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program."); id. at 2665 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("If Congress had thought that States might
actually refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would surely have
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This conclusion was echoed by the four Justices who authored the
joint dissent. These Justices noted that while states may be theoreti-
cally free to refuse to embrace the expansion and forgo the money,
[w]hen a heavy federal tax is levied to support a federal program
that offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical
matter, be unable to refuse to participate in the federal program
and to substitute a state alternative. . .. [W]ithdrawal would likely
force the State to impose a huge tax increase on its residents, and
this new state tax would come on top of the federal taxes already
paid by residents to support subsidies to participating States.22 6
For the dissenters, putting states to such a Hobson's Choice "would
permit Congress to dictate policy in areas traditionally governed
primarily at the state or local level," 22 7 thus ending any semblance of
state sovereignty in the federal system. 2 28 Still, they cautioned that
"courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional [un-
der the anticoercion principle] unless the coercive nature of an offer
is unmistakably clear."2 29
What is striking about the discussion of both the mandate and the
Medicaid expansion is the degree to which the Justices explicitly fo-
cused on the safeguards protecting individuals or states from con-
gressional abuse or overreaching. 230 That the Court upheld the man-
date as a permissible tax, while finding the spending conditions
impermissibly coercive, moreover, confirms our theory that what
matters is not necessarily subject area, but the Court's perception
about the viability of robust political safeguards relative to judicially
enforced ones.2 31
devised a backup scheme so that the most vulnerable groups in our society, those previous-
ly eligible for Medicaid, would not be left out in the cold.").
226. Id. at 2661-62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2662.
228. Id. at 2661.
229. Id. at 2662.
230. In similar fashion, Justice Ginsburg grounded her dissent from the Court's ruling
on the Medicaid expansion, at least in part, on the presence of adequate political safe-
guards. First, she rejected the notion that the Medicaid expansion threatened political
accountability by muddying the waters as to which level of government-federal or state-
was ultimately responsible for Medicaid policy: "no such confusion is apparent in this case,"
she wrote, "[because] Medicaid's status as a federally funded, state-administered program
is hardly hidden from view." Id. at 2633 n.17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Additionally, she
thought that the coercion analysis depended too heavily on the resolution of issues that
must, and would, be resolved through the political process itself. See id. at 2641 ("The coer-
cion inquiry . . . appears to involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.").
Finally, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the political pressures that could be brought to bear on
federal officials tasked with distributing money to the states, which would make those
officials "all the more reluctant to cut off funds Congress has appropriated for a State's
needy citizens." Id. at 2641 n.27.
231. We acknowledge at this point that our theory raises other questions. For example,
assuming that our thesis is correct, is the Court's approach normatively defensible? Should
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the utility and ubiquity of AEDs in constitutional adjudi-
cation, there are notable examples where the Court declines to create
or implement them. The Court's own reasons for this decision include
concerns about institutional competence and a need to defer to other
branches, constitutionally significant distinctions between proscribed
conduct and the actions alleged to be evasive, reluctance to ground
AEDs in allegations of impermissible purpose, and concerns about the
consequences that an AED might have on constitutional doctrine.
While these reasons no doubt influence the Court's decision whether
or not to employ an AED, we think that they only tell part of the sto-
ry. The common thread in the anti-anti-evasion cases is that they typ-
ically, in one measure or another, involve taxing or spending deci-
sions or the provision of government-subsidized goods and services.
Underlying this commonality, and of much greater significance, is the
Court's perception that these cases normally present a context where
there are sturdy political safeguards that adequately monitor and en-
force the relevant constitutional principle better than would a judi-
cially crafted decision rule. Indeed, that the Court sometimes employs
AEDs even in taxing and spending cases suggests that the driving
factor is not the subject matter of the litigation but, rather, the
Court's evaluation of the strength of applicable process protections.
In this way, the actions of the Court when it employs anti-anti-
evasion confirm our earlier observation that when the Court chooses
among decision rules, it is engaging in a form of risk regulation.2 32
Just as AEDs suggest that the Court's doctrinal formation is a type of
risk assessment that seeks to achieve optimal (rather than maximal)
precautions, 2 33 the decision not to create an AED suggests that the
Court believes adequate (even if incomplete) protections already exist
without the need for additional decision rules. Moreover, the Court's
evaluation in anti-anti-evasion cases seems to be that extra judicial
the existence of political safeguards be as influential to the development of constitutional
doctrine as we suggest it is as a practical matter? Additionally, there are questions about
what baselines the Court uses in determining whether political protections are sufficiently
robust to avoid the creation of an AED, as well as whether those baselines are themselves
justifiable. These are important questions, and we hope to take them up in future work.
For now, however, we have decided to leave them unanswered-even at the risk of seeming
dodgy or indolent. As we explain below, we hope that our work here provides a hypothesis
that can be tested against future cases. Before delving into these more difficult questions,
we would like further evidence that our hypothesis actually holds up.
232. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1813-15 (discussing risk regulation). We return
to our doctrine-as-risk-regulation argument in a work currently in progress. Brannon P.
Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine as Risk Regulation (unpublished work
in progress) (drafts on file with authors).
233. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1814.
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protections ultimately would prove riskier than leaving the issue to
the political safeguards that are already operating.
Assuming there is something to our hypothesis, what are its im-
plications? For us, it answers a question that had bothered us since
the first article-why does the Court sometimes refuse to create
AEDs? Beyond simply satisfying our own academic curiosity, we
think that our articles, taken together, have broader implications as
well. First, AEDs and the phenomenon of anti-anti-evasion drill down
into possible reasons the Court has for adopting a set of decision
rules or for choosing one set of decision rules over others that are
available. Earlier work (usefully) described factors bearing on the
Court's choices in rather abstract terms.23 4 Here we have described a
concrete choice often presented to the Court and offered a theory as
to why it accepts or declines the opportunity to make one choice or
another. This, we hope, contributes to the ongoing attempt to de-
scribe accurately what courts, in fact, do when they decide cases. At
the very least, we have furnished a hypothesis that can be tested
against future cases and their outcomes.
But we hope it is not too presumptuous of us to suggest that our
thesis might be of value to judges and lawyers, not just academics.
Our hypothesis suggests an additional reason, other than the ones
given by the Court, driving its decisions whether or not to create
AEDs. By identifying a factor that seems to be influencing the Justic-
es' decisions-a factor that may have escaped the full awareness of
the Justices themselves-we hope to encourage the Justices to be
more intentional in selecting among available decision rules, and
perhaps more transparent in the reasoning behind the adoption of
one set over others.
If our hypothesis holds up, moreover, practicing lawyers might
obviously benefit. If an advocate is asking the Court to create or
adopt an AED, then she will know in advance the necessity of care-
fully crafting arguments that stress the inadequacy of existing politi-
cal safeguards and the need for an AED as a result. 23 5 Conversely,
those defending against claims that the Court should adopt or apply
an AED might stress not only the presence of one or more of the fac-
tors to which the Court regularly avers when it engages in anti-anti-
evasion, but might also stress any political safeguards that render an
AED unnecessary, if not pernicious.
234. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 2, at 92-96; see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE
MYTH OF JUDIcIAL ACTIVISM 26-32 (2006).
235. In like fashion, our hypothetical advocate will, we hope, also know what argu-
ments not to make. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (noting the Court's re-
luctance to create AEDs solely on the basis of alleged improper governmental purpose).
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